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Abstract. How is our temporal experience possible? When we hear
a song, we are aware that every note is before and after another note
(and that’s howwe remember it), but we also ’experience-as-present’
more than one note at a time. To answer this question, I suggest an
analogy with the difference drawn, in the spatial case, between the
two different mechanisms of counting and ’subitizing’ (the immedi-
ate visual capture of a certain number of items as a single object). My
proposal is to identify two different mechanisms even in the tempo-
ral case: a temporal counting, a coconscious experiential ’single look’
of a temporal interval; and a temporal subitizing, an atomic storing
operation which organizes every event in amathematical, point-like
sequence. These two mechanisms are taken to be operative always
and together; we never cease to store the events encountered in a
temporal line, but we also experience a subgroup of them as present.
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1 The models of our temporal phenomenology and
a shared problem
The threemain accounts1 of our experience of time andpresentness are theCin-
ematic Model, the Retentional Model and the Extentional Model. Cinematists
reject the idea of a Specious Present. They maintain that our temporal phe-
nomenology is a succession of momentary states of consciousness. In our phe-
nomenology we always know what comes first and what second; then, the best
model to describe our temporal awareness is one inwhich there aremomentary
states of consciousness (physiologically momentary: about 30ms, time under
which we can’t distinguish the order of two stimuli2). But how can they account
for perceptions of motions? While, in fact, there is a distinct frame to point at
when we want to know where does the experience “I see the green apple on the
desk” come from (there is a frame containing the green apple), we can’t do the
same with the also very familiar experience “I see the green apple falling from
the desk” (in every frame the apple is in one position: it is never falling). If our
perceptual consciousness consists of a succession of momentary experiences,
we never really perceive the apple falling in the same way we perceive it ’being
green’. Where, then, does this dynamical feature of our experience come from?
It seems that a story needs to be told about how, from this succession of expe-
riences, we have an experience of succession. One thing is to have in mind the
different positions that an object occupied in time and have the cognitive un-
derstanding that it moved, and another thing is to directly perceive it moving3.
It is to save this last intuition that the two other models of temporal experi-
ence were born – Retentionalism and Extentionalism. These models are realists
about phenomenal temporality: change, succession and persistence can be di-
rectly perceived or apprehended4. Both Extensional and Retentional theorists
agree that a temporal spread of contents can be apprehended as a unity. Not
only, then, simultaneous contents can be experienced together, but even con-
tents that are successive; contents which are apprehended as unified in this way
belong to a single specious present. How is it possible, however, to perceive an
extended present? When we hear three close auditory tones, we seem to hear
themusical phrase as present, and yet we also hear the notes as successive, and
1SeeRashbrook (2013), Prosser (2013, 2016), andHoerl (2014b,a, 2015) for anextensivediscussion
on the matter.
2Stimuli of around 1ms need to be separated from one another by in interval of around 30 msec
if they are to be perceivedasa succession – a result which holds across sensory modalities. Stimuli
which are separated by shorter intervals are not perceived as distinct.
3Obviously enough, many refined arguments could be put forward by the Cinematist to defend
her position: all I’m trying to do here, however, is to present the main models of our temporal phe-
nomenology to show how the Specious Present is present in them.
4There is the possibility to build a ’Cinematist Realist’ model, but virtually every philosopher of
time who defends Cinematism is an Anti-realist about phenomenal temporality.
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therefore as extending over an interval. How could a succession of elements
– elements which are experienced as before and after – also be experienced as
present in toto? Retentionalist and Extentionalist, while accepting both the idea
of an extended Specious Present, give different accounts of this apparent para-
dox.
Retentionalists agree thatour experiencesoccurwithinepisodesof conscious-
ness which lack an objective, clock-time extension: but these episodes, they
maintain, are composed by an immediate experience and a representation (or
retention) of the recent past; the result is that the contents of these experiences
represent temporally extended intervals. The stream of consciousness, then, is
composed of succession of momentary states – just as the Cinematists claim:
the difference, however, is that the experience of these momentary states is one
of duration. The confinement to a momentary present is seen by Retentional-
ists as a condition for contents to be experienced together: phenomenal unity
needs the simultaneous presentation of contents to a single momentary aware-
ness. Retentionalists, however, are typically accused to have invented “nothing
but a new word” (Dainton 2000, p. 155): what is a retention, and in what differs
from amemory? Until we explain how does it work, it is just an ad hoc solution.
How is that possible that a portion of what the Retentionalist herself calls re-
cent ’past’ is added to our present, point-like experience, creating a newwhole?
Shouldn’t there be some sort of difference between the present and the retained
past? Isn’t it, then, just another version of the Cinematic model, in which we
simply call the awareness of the recent past with a different name? If we choose
the other horn of the dilemma, however – clearly differentiating memories and
retentions – we risk to multiply the experiences: shouldn’t we hear-as-present
a sound in all the different point-like Specious Presents that contain it? This is
why Extentionalists claim that the Specious Present is not merely experiential,
but extends over clock-time; they hold that the atomic unit of our perception is
an extended period of time: we have an experience of succession because we
directly experience the succession. The Retentionalist doctrine that diachronic
phenomenal unity can only exist in strictly momentary states of consciousness
is rejected, in favour of a more ’natural’ model of temporal awareness: change
and persistence are incorporated in our experience in a quite straightforward
way, since our stream of consciousness is composed of a succession of an ex-
tended chunk of experience; the main Extentionalist claim, then, is that experi-
ence itself is extendend, and not just its content (vehicle and content share their
temporal properties). The Extentionalists’ Specious Present is itself temporally
extended, and its parts succeed one another in time in just the way they seem
to: our experiences extend over a period of real time, in a way which (almost
infallibly) matches the phenomenal period it presents.
Realists about phenomenal temporality, such as Extentionalists and Reten-
RivistaItalianadiFilosofiaAnaliticaJunior
9:2
(2018)
196
Andrea Roselli Temporal Subitizing and Temporal Counting
tionalists, explain the immediacy associated with experiences of change, per-
sistence, succession, in a quite direct way; their problem however, one that Cin-
ematists don’t seem to face, is to explain how is it possible that the succession
experienced in the extendedpresent doesn’t collapse in a temporalunicum: how
is it possible, for contents that are all experienced as present, to be presented to
our conscious life as in succession rather than simultaneously? How come that
not only objectively, but even phenomenologically, there is a before and an af-
ter in a Specious Present? Shouldn’t the extended present be experienced as a
totul-simul (we directly experience the succession of notes without confusing
their order)?
How,moreover, shouldwe divide one extended present from another? While
it was obvious in the Cinematist case (every single perception, such as a note,
is one present experience), it is not so obvious in the Retentionalist or Exten-
tionalist case: how long are these extended present experiences, and how they
succeed one another without giving the feeling of a continuous hiccup (which
is a stream, of course, but a very unappealing one)? There is a double dilemma,
then, for the realist about phenomenal temporality: how could it be that within
these wholes there is a succession, a before and an after? And how could it be
that each experienced whole seamlessly gives way to the next?
In this paper I sketch a possible way out from this double dilemma; what the
three differentmodels of our temporal phenomenology have in common is that
they all try to reduce one side of our temporal phenomenology to the other; Cin-
ematists give priority to the phenomenology of succession, and try to minimize
the experience of a Specious Present; Extentionalists and Retentionalists give
priority to the Specious Present, but they have problems when it comes to ex-
plain why our extended experiences of a temporal ’present’ don’t merge all the
perceptions in one simultaneous datum. The novelty of my proposal consists
in the acceptance of the paradox – cognitive neuroscience may indicate us the
way to a better model, and our possibility to act and react will be crucial in this
phenomenological model of our temporal perception.
2 Synchronic and diachronic unity
There are twomacro-areasof concern regarding thephenomenologyof our tem-
poral experience: questions about synchronic unity at a time, and questions
about diachronic unity over time. Not only, in fact, do we experiencemany suc-
cessivemovements of anobject in front of us as fluidly reunited in a temporal ex-
tendednow, our presentmoment; we also experience an endless streamof these
’nows’, without being capable of pinpointing, locating or even remotely feeling
any kind of definite boundary between them. There have been attempts to ar-
gue in favor of a unified account, providing one answer to both questions: how-
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ever, it seems that there are some structural differences that make it impossible.
Oliver Rashbrook (2013) argues very convincingly that similar solutionshide two
very different notions of ’togetherness’. While in fact, on the onehand, ’being ex-
perienced together’ is a transitive relation in our experience of synchronic unity
at a time, it is a non-transitive relation in our experience of diachronic unity over
time (the continuity of consciousness tells a very different story from that of a
single, prolonged experience during our waking hours). But the relation can’t be
both, at least not in a unified account of our temporal phenomenology.
There seems tobe a genuineproblemhere. Consider the auditory experience
of a fast piano song; our phenomenological experience of ’the present’ is a single
look, so to speak, to a brief succession of notes. We simply can’t experience-as-
present only one note at a time (remember: it is a fast song). Still, after one
minute not only are we aware that we are not experiencing the beginning of the
song: we also don’t experience-as-present the first notes of the song. Theremust
be in play here two very different ways to have a temporal experience: on the
one hand, there is a brief but extended present, that even if distinguishes the
succession of (say) three notes, comprises them all in a single temporal present
experience – as the single vision of three dots on a screen: you can tell that there
is one on the left, one in the center, and one on the right: still, you don’t need
to look singularly in turn at every one of them to tell. In this case, ’togetherness’
is a transitive relation. On the other hand, there is a completely different way
to temporally experience the song: instead of a single look, it resembles much
more the operation of storing the notes in succession; in this case, ’togetherness’
has a whole different meaning.
It seems that there are two different phenomenological processes going on:
if we had absolute pitch and a prodigious, Mozart-like memory, at the end of
the song we would remember perfectly the stream of the notes, being capable
of saying which were played before, and which were played after; if we chose a
random note, we would be able to tell which notes were in its past, and which
notes were in its future; our total temporal experience of the song, then, is that
of a continuous stream of temporally ordered single notes; a mathematical suc-
cession of points, so to speak. A totally different process, however, is responsible
for our direct temporal experience while the song is being played. Think of what
youwould answer if someone asked you, during the song, “what are you hearing
now?”: instead of an ordered succession of single notes being present and suc-
cessively, in turn, being stored in the past, your present experience wouldmuch
more likely be that of abrief successionofmultiplenotes, which – even if they are
in succession – are all felt as part of the same present; there are more-than-one
notes in our experiential now.
Let me make another example. Suppose you live in a poor and dangerous
neighborhood; one night, you got frightened by the sudden sound of two close
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gun shots (say, 100ms from one another). Try to imagine your temporal expe-
rience: even if you heard two separate shots, you do not experience the first ’as
past’ when you hear the second. Nonetheless, when the police officers interro-
gate you, you have no problem telling that one shot was before the other; you
are absolutely aware that, technically, when one was present the other was in its
past. Indeed, at the end of that ugly night, you remember a stream, a sequence
of temporal ordered gun shots; the single experience that you had when you
heard the two close shots – when you could actually act – is lost, replaced by an
ordinate succession available for your memory.
Maybe the simplest option is even the right one: if we experience two such
different things, it could be because there are two different phenomenological
processes going on, and our temporal experience is twofold: to make my pro-
posal clearer, I am going to propose an analogy with a spatial debate, which has
significantly been tackled with the recourse of such a dualism between two dis-
tinct ways of operating of our intellect: counting and ’subitizing’. It is important
to stress at this point, however, that the analogy serves merely to indicate the
direction I am taking: I do not intend to claim that there is a straightforward
relation between my temporal model and the spatial models that make use of
the notion of ’subitizing’; it is obviously possible to explore the conceptual link
between them, but it is beyond the purposes of the present paper.
’Subitizing’ is a latinism coined5 in the mid-fifties to describe the immedi-
ate visual capture of a certain number of items, to be distinguished from the
usual action of counting. The idea behind it was to see if there were a cogni-
tive description of our everyday-life different performances in front of streams
of not-grouped and grouped numbers (4939724 and 4,939,724; car plates; bank
accounts; etc.). Experimental results6 showed a significant difference between
judgmentsmade for displays composed of one to four items, and for displays of
more items; of course, response times always rise with the increase of the num-
ber of the items showed, but it is often claimed that there is a dramatic difference
between the two groups7 (see Figure 1).
5See Kaufman et al. (1949).
6See for example Trick and Pylyshyn (1994), or Camos and Tillmann (2008).
7Inside the range 1–4 objects, there is an increase of the time necessary for an accurate response
of about 50ms every added element; in the range +4 objects, however, the increase in response time
becomes of about 300ms.
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Figure 18
In current scientific literature we find a lot of different models to explain these
results. Sometimes (rarely) the limit between subitizing and counting is set after
the third object, instead of the fourth; given that there is never an indisputable
discontinuity in the curvesof response,moreover, there are even thosewhodeny
that there are two differentmechanisms to determine visual numerosity. Gallis-
tel and Gelman (1991), for example, famously claimed that even small sets of
items are quantified by serial counting, albeit with faster speed than for larger
sets: subitizing, then,would just bea fancyword to say ’fast counting’. Others see
in our ability to subitize small groups of numbers a similarity to object recogni-
tion: Mandler and Shebo (1982), for example, argued that subjects recognize the
characteristic geometric configuration of sets of objects (for example: 1, point;
2, line; 3, triangle). This pattern recognition would fail for sets of more items, at
which point the subject would then start to (slowly) count. Trick and Pylyshyn
(1994) attributed subitizing to the parallel assignation of pointers called ’fingers
of instantiation’ to each object in a visual display; these ’fingers’, it is assumed,
are available in a limited number (four), as it is suggested by multiple object
tracking experiments. Subitizing, then, would be based primarily on preatten-
tive processing, and be dissociated from serial counting. To similar conclusion
came Dehaene and Cohen (1994), Simon and Vaishnavi (1996), Robertson et al.
(1997), Piazza et al. (2002), Maloney et al. (2010).
A disquisition on the singlemodels’merit exceeds the purposes of this thesis;
it is sufficient to say that, even if many possible explanations have been put for-
8I created this figure on the basis of the data presented in Akin and Chase (1978), Klahr andWal-
lace (1976) and Mandler and Shebo (1982); in their result, it is shown the non-trivial fact that the
subjects of the experiments needed, in order to press a button and tell the exact number of elements
on a screen, 25 to 100 more milliseconds every added element in the range 1-4, but after the fourth
element the difference for every added element suddenly raised to 250-350 milliseconds per added
element. The ’elbow’ shown in the figure is also confirmed by Trick and Pylyshyn (1994), in which it
is considered the percentage of errors made by the subjects.
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ward to explain such a dramatic difference between our abilities to enumerate
objects, there seems to be a convincing amount of proofs pointing in the direc-
tion of the existence of two different mechanisms at the basis of our different
performances in front of a visual display of objects. What I’m proposing, with-
out suggesting a straightforward relation, is a temporal analogy. It seems, in fact,
that even in the temporal case there are at work two different processes: while
a temporal subitizing has an ’action guidance task’, which is responsible for our
directly experienced present – a single ’temporal look’ at an extended period of
time that comprises a succession of more notes (for example) in an immediate
co-conscious present temporal experience – a temporal counting has the cogni-
tive task to store in succession the events perceived. Before turning to the main
argument of this paper, however, it is necessary to draw a distinction between
long-term, short-term and working memory.
3 Long-term, Short-term andWorkingmemory
Three typesofmemoryaredistinguished in scientific literature: long-termmem-
ory, short-termmemory, andworkingmemory. It is crucial to introduce this dis-
tinction at this point of the paper because, as I will argue in the next session, it is
possible that temporal subitizing has to do with short-term or workingmemory
mechanisms, while temporal counting has to do with long-term memory pro-
cesses. Let me proceed in order and clarify the distinctions, first.
Long-termmemory is a vast store of knowledge and a record of prior events,
and it exists according to all theoretical views. Short-term memory reflect fac-
ulties of the human mind that can hold a limited amount of information in a
very accessible state temporarily. Onemight relate short-termmemory to a pat-
tern of neural firing that represents a particular idea and onemight consider the
idea to be in short-termmemory only when the firing pattern, or cell assembly,
is active. The individual might or might not be aware of the idea during that
period of activation. As Nelson Cowan (2001, 2008) showed, short-term mem-
ory differs from long-termmemory in respect to temporal decay and (crucial for
the present argument) chunk capacity limits. Working memory, then, has been
conceived and defined in three different, slightly discrepantways: as short-term
memory applied to cognitive tasks, as amulti-component system that holds and
manipulates information in short-term memory, and as the use of attention to
manage short-term memory. Regardless of the definition, there are some mea-
sures of memory in the short term that seem routine and do not correlate well
with cognitive aptitudes and other measures (those usually identified with the
term “working memory”) that seem more attention demanding and do corre-
late well with these aptitudes. What is clear, however, is that workingmemory is
not completely distinct from short-termmemory. It is a term that was originally
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used to refer to memory as it is used to plan and carry out behavior. One re-
lies on working memory to retain the partial results while solving an arithmetic
problem without paper or to combine the premises in a lengthy rhetorical ar-
gument. Measures of working memory have been found to correlate with in-
tellectual aptitudes (and especially fluid intelligence) better than measures of
short-termmemory and, in fact, possibly better thanmeasures of any other par-
ticular psychological process (see for example Conway et al. 2005). This reflects
the use of measures that incorporate not only storage but also processing, the
notion being that both storage and processing have to be engaged concurrently
to assess workingmemory capacity in away that is related to cognitive aptitude.
Butwhat are the relationsbetween long-term, short-term, andworkingmem-
ory mechanisms? Short-term memory is derived from a temporarily activated
subset of information in long-termmemory. This activated subsetmay decay as
a function of time unless it is refreshed, although the evidence for decay is still
tentative at best. A subset of the activated information is the focus of attention,
which appears to be limited in chunk capacity (how many separate items can
be included at once). New associations between activated elements can form
the focus of attention. The distinction between short-term memory and work-
ing memory is clouded in a bit of confusion but that is largely the result of dif-
ferent investigators using different definitions. Cowan et al. (2006) proposed,
on the basis of some developmental and correlational evidence, that multiple
functions of attention are relevant to individual differences in aptitudes. The
control of attention is relevant, but there is an independent contribution from
the number of items that can be held in attention, or its scope. According to this
view, what may be necessary for a working memory procedure to correlate well
with cognitive aptitudes is that the task must prevent covert verbal rehearsal so
that the participant must rely onmore attention-demanding processing and/or
storage to carry out the task. The idea is that a working memory test will cor-
relate well with cognitive aptitudes to the extent that it requires that attention
be used for storage and/or processing. In sum, the question of whether short-
termmemory and working memory are different may be a matter of semantics.
There are clearly differences between simple serial recall tasks that do not corre-
late verywellwith aptitude tests in adults, andother tasks requiringmemory and
processing, or memory without the possibility of rehearsal, that correlate much
better with aptitudes. Whether to use the term working memory for the latter
set of tasks, or whether to reserve that term for the entire system of short-term
memory preservation and manipulation, is a matter of taste. The more impor-
tant, substantive questionmay bewhy some tasks correlate with aptitudemuch
better than others.
Thedistinctionbetween long-termandshort-termmemorydependsonwhe-
ther it canbedemonstrated that thereareproperties specific to short-termmem-
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ory; the main candidates include temporal decay and a chunk capacity limit.
The question of decay is still prettymuch open to debate, whereas there is grow-
ing support for a chunkcapacity limit. Thedistinctionbetweenshort-termmem-
ory andworkingmemory is one that depends on the definition that one accepts.
Nevertheless, the substantive question is why some tests of memory over the
short term serve as some of the best correlates of cognitive aptitudes, whereas
others do not. The answer seems to point to the importance of an attentional
system used both for processing and for storage. The efficiency of this system
and its use in working memory seem to differ substantially across individuals,
as well as improving with development in childhood and declining in old age.
4 Temporal subitizing and temporal counting
Whatwe are looking for is an account of our phenomenology capable of explain-
ingwhywe see temporal extendedphenomena, suchasmotions, as clear anddi-
rectly as colors. The account should also indicate the extension of this extended
present; it should explain why we are simultaneously capable of decomposing
our auditory experience of a song in a succession of notes (point-like presents)
and still composingmore-than-onenotes in a single present experience; the dif-
ferent models of our temporal phenomenology sketched above (Cinematism,
Retentionalism, Extensionalism) try to give a unified account of these two phe-
nomenological aspects, but it is always one of them reduced – and thus, in a cer-
tain sense, sacrificed – to theother. A goodway to characterize ourphenomenol-
ogy, then, could be represented by the distinction between two different ways to
temporally experience the events, inspired by the debate regarding the mental
processes that allow us to transform a given perceptual input into a proper mo-
tor output.
Whenwe thinkback, not onlyweknow that eventAprecededeventB:wealso
lose the sensation of a unique temporal experience of them – we only feel them
as part of an ordered stream. In our present, however, the situation is different:
we can’t help but subitize the contents of our perception; we can’t look at a ball
as being in different positions at different times: we see themotion. We can even
force ourselves to consider only a point-like instant, but we can’t perceive it as
being so: our temporal phenomenology of the present is always extended. As in
a single vision of an image there is a left and a right, in our extended temporal
experienceof thepresentwe recognize anafter andabefore. Whenweseean im-
age containing three points we subitize: we are almost immediately conscious
of the fact that there are three points; if we wish, we can also focus on every one
of them singularly, ’counting’ them, but we can’t help to simultaneously have a
general vision of the figure as containing one object on the left, one in the cen-
ter, one on the right. If more objects are added, however, we lose the ability to
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subitize: we start to focus on little areas of the image, subitizing on those, and
moving our focus (that’s what we do when, for example, we group numbers as
in 345,678,912).
Think of the present experience of hearing two close sounds, onemuch lon-
ger than the other (say, 200ms of the note DO and 100ms of the note LA). Our
temporal phenomenology tells a story of one present: we had one experience,
we didn’t ’have time’ to have an experience and then another one (when we ex-
perience the note LA, the note DO isn’t in our phenomenological past: it doesn’t
’feel past’); still, there is a sense inwhichwehave experienced thedifferent dura-
tion; it is as if our experiencewere simultaneouslymadeof parts and still integral
andundivided. Theproposal, then, is to thinkof twodifferentwaysof experienc-
ing the continuous encounter of a succession of numbers (events): on the one
hand we ’temporally count’ them, storing them singularly and attributing them
a particular, point-like present, as in the series 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9: every number
is alone in its present; on the other hand we ’temporally subitize’ them, directly
experiencing a series of them as already being together, animated, and making
the cinematic metaphor disappear, as in the series 123, 456, 789 – where 123 is
a single experience of motion from 1 to 3: the total experience does not consist
of three stationary image, but of amotion. When the subject subitizes, then, she
’knows’ that the first note (DO x 200ms) was played before and longer than the
LA, butwhat she experiencedwas a co-conscious present experience of ’DOOO-
LA’; the first note wasn’t in her experiential past when she heard the second one.
Themodel should thus translatenot only the twodifferent temporal experiences
famously discerned by Broad, but also the fact that we are contemporaneously
aware that something is moving and feel it moving.
Even in the spatial case, when presented with a great number of objects, we
simultaneously subitize and count: we shift our viewpoint around the display
andkeep trackof our count, butwealso tend to see subgroupsof objects, subitiz-
ing them. Our temporal experience is continuously presenting us with events,
and even if we are able to count them, storing them in order as if they were dis-
posed in a uni-dimensional mathematical line (knowing which note is before
and what is after), we also subitize subgroups of events, experiencing them in a
co-conscious present, seeing them in a single look. When we hear three notes
of a song, then, there is an immediate awareness of the auditory elements, we
hear them in a single, co-conscious experience; if the notes become ten, on the
other hand, we lose the overall sensation of a single experience, and at the tenth
note we already feel that the first is ’past’: we can’t ’see’ the ten notes as a single
object.
The difference drawn between subitizing and counting in a temporal con-
text could be correlated with the differences described in current literature be-
tween long-termmemory and short-term and working-memory and, in partic-
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ular, with attentive and pre-attentive estimationmechanisms (as suggested, for
example, in Burr, Turi, and Anobile 2010). Even when subjects do not have the
time or opportunity to count the number of objects in the field of view, they
can estimate numerosity rapidly (approximate estimation of number has been
demonstrated in humans, see for exampleWhalen, Gallistel, and Gelman 1999).
The ability to estimate number correlates strongly with mathematics achieve-
ment (Halberda,Mazzocco, and Feigenson 2008), suggesting it is strongly linked
to other number-based capacities. Estimation of numerosity is rapid and ef-
fortless but not errorless. Error increases in direct proportion to the number of
items to be estimated, a property known as Weber’s law. The Weber fraction,
defined as the just noticeable difference or precision threshold divided by the
mean, is usually found to be quite constant over a large range of base numerosi-
ties. Thus, subitizingmay be nothing special, merely a consequence of the reso-
lution of estimation mechanisms and the quantal separation at low numbers.
However, this idea has not received experimental support; as Burr, Turi, and
Anobile (2010, p. 20) comment, “subitizing tends to be resistant to attempts to
disrupt it”. In particular, it seems that subitizing depends strongly on attentional
resources, while estimation of larger quantities depends far less on attentional
load. Subitizing is often considered to be a pre-attentive process, while enu-
meration of larger numbers is considered to require attention (although this is
more controversial). There has been some debate as to whether subitizing uses
the same or different mechanisms than those of higher numerical ranges and
whether it requires attentional resources. Recent results9 seem to show that the
mechanisms operating over the subitizing and estimation ranges are not iden-
tical, and that pre-attentive estimation mechanisms works at all ranges, but in
the subitizing range attentive mechanisms also come into play. The question is
thorny, but there is a good experimental base to claim that in the temporal cases
discussed above there may be two different mechanisms at work.
An easy objection, at this point, would come from the request of a precise in-
dication of the boundaries of our temporal subitizing. I don’t have an answer to
that, but it isn’t necessarily a flaw of the model here exposed. Experiences such
as ’hearing a song’ strongly suggest the existence of a present temporal window
– we experience-as-present a non-point-like extension of the song, but much
shorter than the song itself. When we temporally subitize, we try to keep under
one, general look a duration of time (for example, many notes of a song); the
operation becomes harder and harder with the passage of time and the accu-
mulation of notes, and the first notes of the song start to slide away. But not only
are the boundaries between the two way to experience the events not manifest:
they could also depend, for example, on how much we are inclined to focus on
the single notes rather then a rhythm; on our ability to anticipate the future; on
9See for example Burr, Turi, and Anobile (2010).
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how well we know the song, etc. My hypothesis is that there isn’t an unambigu-
ous and unique window in which we temporally subitize, then, but I think there
is, however, a clear phenomenological distinction between temporal subitizing
and temporal counting. The difficulty, as we have seen, could be also attributed
to the limits of the working memory. Progress in the field of the distinction be-
tween the different types of memories could be relevant to better explain the
phenomenological difference in the temporal case that I have sketched here. It
is also crucial to underline, finally, that it would be misleading to think that the
subitizing is only related to visual experiences10; thoughmore immediate to un-
derstand and test, it is probably better to refer to a ’sensorial subitizing’, instead
of a mere visual one.
Conclusions
The question is: how is our temporal experience possible? Many conflicting ele-
mentsmust coexist: our present is extended, but not a totul simul; it has bound-
aries, but they are shifting and not manifest; it is part of a seamless stream, but
distinct from thepast and the future. My answer to the question is the identifica-
tion of two different mechanisms: a temporal subitizing, a co-conscious expe-
riential ’single look’ of a temporal interval; and a temporal counting, an atomic
storing operation which organizes every event in amathematical, point-like se-
quence.
Given the great amount of changes and events experienced, the two mech-
anisms are taken to be operative always and together: we never cease to store
the events encountered in a temporal line, but we also experience a subgroup of
themas present. Even if we are aware that technically, fromaphysical-mathema
tical perspective, ’the present’ is point-like, our phenomenological present gath-
ers recent events in a co-conscious experience. The twomechanisms described
are at the basis of our twofold temporal experience: the awareness that every
note is before and after another note, and the ’experiencing as present’ of more
than one note.
10Thanks to an anonymous referee for this useful remark.
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